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The possibility to test experimentally the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem is investigated critically,
following the demonstrations by Meyer, Kent and Clifton-Kent that the predictions of quantum
mechanics are indistinguishable (up to arbitrary precision) from those of a non-contextual model,
and the subsequent debate to which extent these models are actually classical or non-contextual.
The present analysis starts from a careful consideration these “finite-precision” approximations.
A stronger condition for non-contextual models, dubbed ontological faithfulness, is exhibited. It is
shown that it allows to formulate approximately the constraints in Bell-Kochen-Specker theorems
such as to render the usual proofs robust. As a consequence, one can experimentally test to finite
precision ontologically faithful non-contextuality, and thus experimentally refute explanations from
this smaller class. We include a discussion of the relation of ontological faithfulness to other proposals
to overcome the finite precision objection.
Attempts at proving that quantum mechanics is fun-
damentally non-classical go back to its very beginning.
They start with the Copenhagen school’s claims of the
necessity of complementarity [1, 2], to von Neumann’s
proof [3], via Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen’s attempt to show
the incompleteness of quantum theory [4], and on to an
intellectual culmination in the work of Bell [5, 6], building
on Gleason [7], as well as Kochen and Specker [8, 9]. But
the subject is full of vigour even today as we witness a re-
newed evaluation of the foundations of quantum mechan-
ics [10–14], now even reaching out to applications such
as device independent quantum cryptography [15, 16].
The work of Bell especially marked a turning point
for the discourse on the non-classical nature of quan-
tum mechanics, in two ways: On the one hand it showed
the need for clear, operationally motivated criteria for
the classicality of a theoretical explanation; on the other
hand it demonstrated operational differences between the
quantum mechanical predictions and those of any theory
based on classical hidden variable in the former sense.
This opened the way for experimental tests of quantum
mechanics at an unprecedented level, from quantum vi-
olations of Bell inequalities [17–19] to experimental veri-
fication of quantum contextuality [20–24].
But just as these various no-go theorems have inspired
the thinking of physicists, so have their refutations, or
nullifications, to use the term of Meyer [25]. Here we
shall take the view of no-go theorems as actually true
mathematical theorems, hence a refutation, rather than
being the demonstration of a mathematical error, con-
sists in showing that a tacit, yet not necessarily plausible
assumption was made.
The present paper concerns the Bell-Kochen-Specker
(BKS) theorems on the impossibility of a non-contextual
hidden variable explanation of the predictions of quan-
tum mechanics. We shall essentially stick to the original
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viewpoint of these authors, owing to Bell’s 1966 review [6]
(which appeared in print later, but actually predates the
1964 non-locality paper [5], whose semi-centenary is cel-
ebrated in the present special issue); non-contextuality is
a property of hidden variable theories, assigning “true”
outcomes to all or some observables in a quantum me-
chanical system, relative to a given state. Risking to
labour an obvious point, recall that for the quantum
theory it does not matter how these observations are
made, as long as they lead to a well-defined POVM – and
there will always be very different-looking procedures, in-
volving separate systems, different quantum information
carriers, or temporal orderings in which the outcome is
generated step-by-step. Regarding the hypothetical hid-
den variable description, however, assumptions have to
be made regarding the relation of the variables attached
to different or even incompatible observables, or relating
them to different measurement procedures. Locality of
the hidden variables is one of these conditions [5, 17], as-
suming a multi-partite quantum system with space-like
separated observers. Non-contextuality can be viewed as
a more “bare bones” and abstract condition, in particu-
lar not requiring a multi-partite system. It is important
to observe that the assumption of locality imposes non-
contextuality on certain sets of hidden variables, a fact
noticed repeatedly (for a recent and exhaustive discussion
see e.g. [26]). Conversely, Bell-Kochen-Specker proofs of
quantum contextuality have inspired Bell inequalities for
non-locality [27].
Since its inception, the notion of non-contextuality has
been deeply examined in a variety of forms. In particular
the work of Spekkens [28] is noteworthy, in that it iden-
tified several distinct aspects of contextuality, and be-
cause it argued the necessity to have operational, theory-
independent definitions of the basic terms. The recent
paper [29] has taken up this challenge for the notion of
“sharp measurement”. (Non-)contextuality is also a re-
cent hot topic in the ongoing quest for physical axioms
limiting the range of conceivable probabilistic theories, in
particular Local Orthogonality [30] and Consistent Exclu-
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2sivity [31–36], were anticipated by Specker [9], cf. [37].
The present paper is structured as follows: Section I
gives an account of usual (infinite precision) BKS theo-
rems in terms of non-contextual inequalities, followed by
the objections raised by Meyer, Kent and Clifton-Kent
(MKC) in section II due to finite precision of any realistic
experiment. After that we present some reflections on the
necessity of being able to identify outcomes in different
experiments (section III) as being in a certain sense “the
same”. The central part is section IV, where the notion
of ontologically faithful non-contextuality (ONC) is intro-
duced, which is designed to reflect the finite precision of
actual experiments in the supposed hidden variable the-
ory; we show then that this notion gives substance to
experimental tests of quantum contextuality, and con-
cretely making non-contextual inequalities robust to fi-
nite precision. In section V we discuss our results and
make a comparison with other approaches, in particular
one based on sequential execution of measurements.
I. BELL-KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREMS
AND NON-CONTEXTUAL INEQUALITIES
Traditionally, Bell-Kochen-Specker (BKS) proofs start
from a collection (Pi : i ∈ V ) of projectors on a finite-
dimensional Hilbert space. Each subset M ⊂ V of indices
with the property that
∑
i∈M Pi = 1 , describes a mea-
surement, more precisely a von Neumann measurement,
with possible outcomes labelled by M . Given a quantum
state ρ, the Born rule then prescribes the probabilities of
outcomes for each measurement M that can be formed
by collecting projectors Pi:
Pr{i|ρ} = Tr ρPi. (1)
The remarkable thing is that this probability depends
only on the outcome i, more precisely on the projector
Pi (given the state, which we consider fixed in our dis-
cussion).
A classical non-contextual hidden variable model for
this scenario is meant to reveal pre-existing values of the
measurements, but in such a way that the indicator Xi ∈
{0, 1} depends on the label i only, and not whether Pi
appears in a measurement M or in another measurement
M ′ – the different contexts. Here, Xi = 1 indicates that
i ∈ M is the outcome if M was measured. The model
reproduces the predictions of quantum theory if EXi =
Pr{i|ρ} = Tr ρPi in accordance with the Born rule (1).
Clearly, a necessary requirement for the possibility of
such a model is that for all possible measurements M ⊂
V , i.e.
∑
i∈M Pi = 1 , ∑
i∈M
Xi = 1. (2)
In words: the assignment Xi picks one and only one
“real” outcome for each measurement M . To be painfully
precise, the relation (2) should hold with probability 1
(allowing for inequality on an event of probability 0),
but we can ignore this detail for the present discussion.
Recall that a random variable is a (measurable) function
Xi : Ω −→ R from a probability space Ω with a probabil-
ity distribution µ (where there is implicit the σ-algebra
of events; cf. [38] or any other modern textbook on prob-
ability for the basic terms). Since Xi takes only values 0
and 1, it is equivalently described by the sets (events in
probability jargon)
Ei = X
−1
i (1) = {ω ∈ Ω : Xi(ω) = 1},
so that Xi = 1Ei is the indicator function of Ei. The
condition (2) is then equivalent to⋃˙
i∈M
Ei = Ω, (3)
where the notation on the left hand side refers to the
disjoint union. In other words, (Ei : i ∈ M) is a set
partition of Ω.
Kochen and Specker [8] and later many other au-
thors, for a selection see [39, 40] and references therein,
have found sets of projectors Pi in three- and higher-
dimensional Hilbert spaces for which these conditions
are contradictory: there exists no non-contextual hidden-
variable model satisfying either of eqs. (2) or (3).
In those works, the concept of colouring is central,
which is the evaluation of the Xi on a single point ω ∈ Ω:
Xi(ω) ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether i is singled out or not.
The colouring rule is that in every measurement M one
must choose one and only one element. Note that a 0-1-
colouring is a special case of our above notion of classical
non-contextual hidden variable model, namely when the
Xi take values 0 or 1 with unit probability. Conversely,
a probability distribution over colourings gives rise to a
classical non-contextual hidden variable model.
With respect to these colourings, we strongly suggest
however to take a probabilistic point of view as explained
above, since the aim of a hidden variable theory is not
merely a logically consistent assignment of values (surely
a necessary condition), but the explanation of observed
statistical data. Indeed, a broader approach, leaving a
role also for the quantum state, is to consider within
the set V subsets C (which we shall call contexts) such
that
∑
i∈C Pi ≤ 1 ; i.e., rather than demanding that C
describes a measurement, we only require that it can be
completed to one. The set of all contexts, denoted Γ, is
a collection of subsets of V (aka hypergraph), and now a
non-contextual hidden variable model only has to satisfy
∀ contexts C ∈ Γ
∑
i∈C
Xi ≤ 1. (4)
With this small modification every set of projectors, with
associated collection Γ of contexts, has a non-contextual
hidden variable model, but there are differences in the
attainable expectation values (ti = Pr{i} : i ∈ V ), be it
3as quantum expectations (Tr ρPi : i ∈ V ) or as classical
expectations (EXi : i ∈ V ).
For instance, in a traditional BKS proof, where∑
i∈C Pi = 1 for each context C ∈ Γ, we know that∑
i∈C EXi ≤ 1, but we cannot reach equality in all of
the C ∈ Γ, hence∑
C∈Γ
∑
i∈C
EXi ≤ |Γ| − 1. (5)
By contrast, quantum mechanics attains |Γ| =∑
C∈Γ
∑
i∈C〈Pi〉, in fact for every state! Thus, BKS
proofs can be interpreted as statements concerning the
(im-)possibility of realising certain constraints among
projector effects in the quantum case, and events in the
classical case.
More generally, we may consider non-contextual in-
equalities of the form∑
i∈V
λiEXi ≤ βcl, (6)
where λi ≥ 0 are certain coefficients and βcl is the maxi-
mum of the l.h.s. over all non-contextual hidden variable
models, i.e. Xi ∈ {0, 1} satisfying eq. (4). Substitut-
ing quantum expectations,
∑
i λi Tr ρPi may exceed the
classical limit βcl up to a quantum maximum of βqu. A
logically consistent way to think about these structures
is to start with the set V of outcomes and the contexts,
i.e. with the hypergraph Γ – this sets the scene of the
possible experiments we want to describe and their out-
comes (crucially identifying outcomes in different exper-
iments as being the same; we’ll return to this later). In
this way we can divorce the logic of speaking about the
experiments from the theory that we believe or hypothe-
size to underly. For instance, a classical, non-contextual,
model for this abstract structure is given by 0-1-variables
Xi satisfying (4), while a quantum model is a collection
of projectors Pi with
∀C ∈ Γ
∑
i∈C
Pi ≤ 1 . (7)
Note that classical models for Γ are a special case of quan-
tum models, where all Pi commute. See [41], where this
formalism was developed further (including also more
general probabilistic theories with convex sets of states
and linear functions on states as effects). In [33] this
framework was developed even more, however returning
to the equality conditions (2) and
∑
i∈C Pi = 1 . To jus-
tify the emphasis on linear inequalities, observe that
E(Γ) = {(EXi) : (Xi) non-contextual HV model},
Θ(Γ) =
{
(Tr ρPi) : (Pi) quantum model, ρ state
}
,
are convex, the first being in fact a polytope, cf. [33, 41,
42].
Remark 1 As we are dealing with projectors, the con-
dition
∑
i∈C Pi ≤ 1 is evidently equivalent to PiPj = 0
(i.e. orthogonality of their supports) for all i 6= j occur-
ring jointly in some context C 3 i, j.
Likewise, for a classical, non-contextual model, the
condition
∑
i∈C Xi ≤ 1 is equivalent to XiXj = 0 for
all i 6= j occurring jointly in some context C 3 i, j.
This relation defines a graph on V , with an edge i ∼ j
if and only if there is a C ∈ Γ with i, j ∈ C. It is known
as exclusivity graph [33, 43].
Rather than dwelling more on the abstract formalism,
let us look at an example [44], which is indeed the one
that inspired the general hypergraph approach [41]:
Example 2 For 5 outcomes V = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and con-
texts Γ = {01, 12, 23, 34, 40}, there is a well-known quan-
tum realization by 5 rank-one projectors Pi in three-
dimensional Hilbert space: This means that PiPi+1 = 0
for all i, where i+ 1 is understood mod 5. Notice that
from these projectors many POVMs can be built, the
simplest ones being the binary measurements (Pi, 1−Pi),
but as this and (Pi+1, 1 − Pi=1) are compatible, we also
have (Pi, Pi+1, 1 − Pi − Pi+1).
However, there can be many other quantum models, in-
cluding higher-rank projectors in higher dimension. For a
suitably chosen state ρ (and interestingly not any state),
we can achieve
∑
i Tr ρPi =
√
5 [44, 45], which is indeed
the quantum maximum, βqu =
√
5 [41].
On the other hand, it is straightforward to check that
the maximum of
∑4
i=0 EXi is βcl = 2.
The above translation, from an unsatisfiable set of logi-
cal constraints to a limitation on expectation values, all of
which are in principle observable quantities, is significant.
It elevates (and generalizes) BKS proofs to experimen-
tally testable propositions, or so it would seem: Indeed,
non-contextual hidden variable models impose a bound
βcl on the expectation value of
∑
i λiXi, eq. (6), which
is violated by the quantum expectation value
∑
i λi〈Pi〉.
There is only one catch, or rather the very reason why
quantum mechanics can outperform non-contextual clas-
sical models: The quantum expectation values are not
accessible in a single von Neumann measurement. What
is more, it is necessary for a gap βcl < βqu to occur, that
the same projector Pi occurs in different, incompatible
measurements, for various i. In the next section we shall
see that this poses not only a conceptual problem, but
also a practical one when purportedly testing quantum
contextuality (i.e. experimentally refuting classical non-
contextual hidden variable explanations).
II. MEYER-CLIFTON-KENT’S
NULLIFICATION OF BKS
Let us start with an easy objection against any physical
relevance of BKS theorems stemming from the fact that
the hidden variable theory for a set of effects is supposed
4to assign pre-existing values only to projective measure-
ments. But in experiments it is highly unlikely that ever a
sharp von Neumann measurement is implemented. What
is more, experimental evidence based on observable ex-
pectation values never allows the experimenter to dis-
tinguish conclusively between a projector (an element in
an ideal measurement) and some arbitrarily close POVM
element (aka effect), i.e. a positive semidefinite operator
upper bounded by 1 , be it another projector or a gen-
uinely non-projective POVM element. However, in this
form this does not pose a worry, since the quantum me-
chanical expectations values of two operators A and B
cannot differ by more than ‖A− B‖, the operator norm
of their difference. This norm difference can be experi-
mentally estimated via the fundamental relation
‖A−B‖ = max
ρ state
|Tr ρA− Tr ρB|.
Thus, we can at least in principle confirm experimen-
tally (within the rules of quantum mechanics and accord-
ing to our command of the underlying physical system)
that the experiments implement POVM elements close
to the required projectors. This is important because al-
lowing general POVM elements, one can reach values of∑
i λi〈Pi〉 even larger than βqu, all the way to
βg = max
i
λiti s.t. ∀i 0 ≤ ti ≤ 1, ∀C ∈ Γ
∑
i∈C
ti ≤ 1,
the maximum value allowable by generalised probabilistic
theories [41, 46]. For instance for the pentagon (Exam-
ple 2), this value is βg =
5
2 .
At the same time, we would naturally demand that
whatever the experiment does, it should have a classical
hidden variable explanation for each measurement out-
come.
This brings us to the objection by Meyer [25], which
was greatly refined and extended by Kent [47], as well as
Clifton and Kent [48]. These authors show that in each
dimension d of the underlying Hilbert space of a quantum
system, there exists a dense set M = {M (1),M (2), . . .}
(w.l.o.g. countable) of complete von Neumann measure-
ments M (j) = (Pj1, . . . , Pjd), consisting of rank-one pro-
jectors, with the property that every Pjk occurs in only
one measurement, namely M (j). Here, “dense” refers to
the set of all von Neumann measurements: for every von
Neumann measurement (Q1, . . . , Qd) and every  > 0,
there exists an M (j) ∈ M such that ‖Qk − Pjk‖ ≤  for
all k.
This set M of measurements clearly has a non-
contextual hidden variable model reproducing the correct
statistics for any given state ρ: Any random variables
Xjk ∈ {0, 1} such that
Pr{Xjk = 1, Xjk̂ = 0 ∀k̂ 6= k} = Tr ρPjk
will do. [In fact, this can even be extended to POVMs
with a bounded number of outcomes.] Such sets are not
so hard to come by, either by existence proofs or con-
structively.
Now, if the experimenter needs to implement a mea-
surement Q = (Q1, . . . , Qd), she can only ensure (and
demonstrate by experimental verification) that she has
done so up to a finite accuracy . In particular, she can-
not distinguish her experimental observations from those
of a suitably close measurement M (j) ∈M – which how-
ever has a genuinely non-contextual hidden variable ex-
planation! In practice, hence, where one can never be
sure which one of the infinitely many measurements ar-
bitrarily close to Q was responsible for the observations,
the experimenter cannot rule out a fully non-contextual
hidden variable theory, nor the concomitant requirement
that “really” only the measurements in the setM are im-
plemented. Note that this has nothing to do with the cor-
rectness of the mathematical reasoning of Gleason, Bell,
Kochen-Specker, and so on (of which simply the prereq-
uisites do not apply), but only concerns its relevance to
the observable world.
Not surprisingly perhaps, this argument, though sim-
ple and in our opinion unrefutable, has sparked a con-
siderable debate that continues in some form until today,
but a review of which is beyond the scope of this pa-
per. See however the excellent discussion and extensive
references in the article of Barrett and Kent [49].
In a nutshell, it is clear to physicists that something
quantum is demonstrated in the experiments: An in-
equality is violated and incompatible measurements are
performed in successive runs. Yet, the Meyer-Clifton-
Kent (MKC) argument shows clearly that something is
lacking to be able to claim experimental confirmation of
quantum contextuality. So, what can we salvage from
this intolerable situation?
III. WHAT DOES “SAME OUTCOME” MEAN?
All discussions of hidden variables in quantum mechan-
ics have to labour one point, in one way or another: the
identification of the quantum theoretic entities, as given
by the formalism, with counterparts in the hypothetical
hidden variable model. This is where inevitably unproven
assumptions are made – have to be made, indeed, as we
know next to nothing about this alternative description,
which after all may not even be real, and rather only
want to talk about the general form of that hypothet-
ical theory, which in addition usually is only meant to
“explain” some small section of the range of observable
phenomena.
In non-contextual hidden variable models, this has to
be done on the level of the measurement outcomes by
postulating 0-1-indicator random variables, singling out
at most one of the possible outcomes of each measure-
ment (one and only one in the original BKS theorems,
but as explained in section I we can relax this to “at
most one”). So far, this is nothing peculiar, and already
the end of the story in the MKC models (see the pre-
5vious section). The curious thing, however, is that in
addition we demand that certain outcomes “i” in one
measurement and outcome “j” in another measurement
(which may require completely different experiments one
from the other) are to be identified. For the hidden vari-
able theory this is taken to mean that the two associated
random variables take the same value; for the quantum
model it means that these outcomes are represented by
the same projector, more general same effect, in the dif-
ferent measurements.
Operationally we can recognize identical effects by
their identical response to all different state prepara-
tions. Turning this around, this is how a theory tells us
what its effects are: concise descriptions of the different
responses (as probabilities of a “click”) of experiments.
Cf. the theory of Ludwig [50], in which states are equiv-
alence classes of state preparations with respect to the
statistics under all possible measurements; and vice versa
measurements (and indeed effect) equivalence classes of
experiments with respect to the statistics under all possi-
ble state preparations. In particular, coarse graining the
outcomes of any procedure to only two yields a binary
measurement, for example assigning “yes” if a particu-
lar click happens, and “no” otherwise. If starting from
two experiments and singling out an outcome in each of
them, we end up with equivalent binary observables, this
allows us to identify the effects corresponding to these
outcomes. (Recall that a priori these outcomes are sim-
ply defined as clicks of a certain kind in two potentially
completely different experimental procedures.)
Following Spekkens’ operational approach [28], a non-
contextual classical hidden variable model has to assign
random variables to each effect, in particular the same
value to all appearances of that effect in different con-
texts. There is probably not any compelling reason to
believe a priori that the hidden variables should have
this property; but it is undoubtedly a very intuitive idea,
rooted in our classical intuition, cf. Bell’s discussion [6].
What the MKC constructions exploit is that our ac-
cess to the quantum mechanical effects is governed by a
topology of closeness, rather than identity; on the other
hand, the previous requirement of non-contextuality does
not put any conditions on the classical entities assigned
to two distinct, but infinitesimally close effects. Towards
the end of Spekkens’ article [28], it is suggested that to
overcome the MKC critique based on finite precision, we
need an extended version of the above identification prin-
ciple, requiring that the elements representing similar ef-
fects in the quantum theory are in some sense similar. In
the next section we present a simple proposal to formu-
late such a similarity principle.
IV. FINITE PRECISION:
ONTOLOGICAL FAITHFULNESS
The effects of quantum theory have a geometry thanks
to the operator norm ‖A−B‖: As explained in section II,
this is the largest difference between expectation values
of the two operators on the same state. Experiments
consequently can pin down an effect only up to statistical
error bars in this norm. In particular, let us consider a
set E of effects sufficiently close to projectors. We call
this an -precise quantum model of a set V of outcomes i
and a collection Γ of contexts C ⊂ V , if every Qi ∈ E is -
close to a projector Pi, and furthermore for every C ∈ Γ,
there is a collection of QCi ∈ E such that
∑
i∈C Q
C
i ≤ 1
and ‖QCi − Pi‖ ≤  for all i ∈ C. This encapsulates the
notion of contexts C, each outcome i of which can be
approximately identified with a projector Pi.
The corresponding classical hidden variable models are
captured by the following definition.
Definition 3 An -ontologically faithful non-contextual
(-ONC) model for a hypergraph Γ of contexts C ⊂ V
consists of a family of random variables XCi ∈ {0, 1},
i ∈ C ∈ Γ, such that
∀C ∈ Γ
∑
i∈C
XCi ≤ 1, and
∀C,C ′ ∈ Γ ∀i ∈ C ∩ C ′ Pr{XCi 6= XC
′
i } ≤ .
In other words: For each context C ∈ Γ, the family
(XCi : i ∈ C) is a classical hidden variable model of a
measurement containing the outcomes C; and the models
for the “same” outcome i occurring in different contexts
C and C ′ almost coincide.
The spirit of this definition is that it imposes a dis-
tance on the random variables XCi representing the dif-
ferent “incarnations” of the outcome i. As we are dealing
with 0-1-variables, the probability of disagreeing is a nat-
ural such measure, but in more complex situations other
distances may be employed.
Logically, both definitions, of an approximate quantum
model and of an ontologically faithful non-contextual
classical model, are independent, hinging directly on the
combinatorial structure of the permissible contexts Γ.
However, it may be helpful to think of the underlying
idea as a robustification of the BKS assignment of a 0-
1-random variable to each projector in a set of quantum
measurements – see Fig. 1.
From approximate to exact non-contextual hid-
den variables. Now we show how the -approximations
introduced above can be eliminated at the expense of
having, with some small probability, no outcome among
the set V . Indeed, we can easily build a non-contextual
hidden variable model from any -ONC model by letting
Yi :=
∏
i∈C∈Γ
XCi . (8)
Note that Y Ci := Yi for i ∈ C defines a 0-ONC model
and that it approximates the original one well:
6P projector
X  ! {0,1}P
P ! Q
X  ! XP Q
! !
FIG. 1. Left: A non-contextual hidden variable model assigns
a random variable XP ∈ {0, 1} to projectors P . Right: In an
ontologically faithful non-contextual model, this assignment
has to respect the geometry of the space of projectors as well
as that of the random variables. On the quantum side, it is
given by the operator norm; on the hidden variable side, by
the probability of being distinct.
Proposition 4 Consider an -ONC model (XCi )i∈C∈Γ
and associated Yi as per eq. (8). Let ki be the number
of times an outcome i occurs in some context C ∈ Γ.
Then the collection (Yi) is a non-contextual hidden vari-
able model, and for every i ∈ V ,
Pr
{∃C 3 i s.t. XCi 6= Yi} ≤ (ki − 1).
Proof. To check that (Yi) defines a non-contextual hid-
den variable model, we observe for every i ∈ C ∈ Γ,
Yi ≤ XCi , hence ∑
i∈C
Yi ≤
∑
i∈C
XCi ≤ 1.
On the other hand, for each i,
Pr
{∃C 3 i s.t. XCi 6= Yi}
= Pr
{
(XCi : i ∈ C ∈ Γ) not all equal}
≤ (ki − 1),
because it is enough to compare a single XC0i against
each other XCi . 2
We record especially the implication of the preceding
result for (linear) non-contextual inequalities.
Proposition 5 Consider a non-contextual inequality∑
i λiEXi ≤ βcl for a set Γ of contexts C ⊂ V , and
ki as in Proposition 4.
Then, for any -ONC (XCi ) and any assignment of a
context i 7−→ Ci 3 i, and letting ti := EXCii we have∑
i
λiti ≤ βcl + 
∑
i
λi(ki − 1).
Proof. Let Yi :=
∏
i∈C∈ΓX
C
i as in eq. (8). Then, Propo-
sition 4 implies
ti = EXCii ≤ EYi + (ki − 1),
and summing over i we are done. 2
Example 6 Returning to the pentagon inequality of
Klyachko et al. [44] (Example 2), we have ki = 2 for
all outcomes i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. The original inequality as∑
i EXi ≤ 2 = βcl, i.e. all λi = 1. Thus, for any
 <
√
5− 2
5
≈ 0.047,
the observation of a value sufficiently close to βqu =
√
5 in
a quantum setup with projectors rules out -ONC hidden
variables.
Example 7 Another example is the contextuality proof
via the Mermin-Peres square [39], which is also the sub-
ject of the experiment in [23]. The set of outcomes one
has to consider here consists of 24 rank-one projectors
in C4, forming 24 contexts of four elements each, each
of which corresponds to a complete orthonormal basis
(cf. [51, Fig. 1]).
It can be shown that
∑
i EXi ≤ 5 = βcl, whereas
the maximum quantum values is βqu = 6 (once more
see [51]). Since each outcome occurs in exactly ki = 4
contexts, a value of
 <
6− 5
72
≈ 0.0138
suffices to rule out -ONC hidden variables for this ex-
periment.
Clearly, in the same way every non-contextual inequal-
ity is made robust to finite precision, by restricting it to
-ONC models with suitably small  > 0. In particu-
lar, this means that the MKC hidden variable models
cannot be ontologically faithful, since they are consistent
with measuring arbitrary quantum observable to any fi-
nite precision.
As a consequence, MKC-like hidden variable models
necessarily have to have parameters inaccessible in quan-
tum mechanics, since they have to assign very different
classical random variables to arbitrarily close projectors.
V. DISCUSSION
Any proof that classical hidden variables cannot repro-
duce the predictions of quantum mechanics is invariably
achieved only under some other assumption, be it non-
contextuality or locality of the classical variables. The
assumption itself is not testable, so it has to be chosen on
other, “reasonable”, grounds. For instance, in Bell tests,
one would argue that no-signalling is a well-established
fact (it follows from special relativity) and that non-local
classical variables would have to come with some incred-
ible mechanism to remain absolutely hidden to prevent
some eventual faster-than-light signal getting out.
For non-contextuality the case is a priori weaker, as
we are not taking recourse to another physical princi-
ple (compare however the ideas formulated in [52, 53] re-
garding memory bounds). Instead, we make assumptions
7on how to describe experiments. That there are such
things as experiments can hardly be denied, the setup
subjecting a system in some reproducible preparation to
measurement, yielding a result. In addition, quantum
mechanics already comes with the identification between
outcomes in experiments and effect operators, even up to
finite precision and statistical error bars. However it can-
not, by definition, tell us anything about the hypothetical
hidden-variable theory – especially if the no-go theorem
involves exhibiting an operational difference between the
two.
Here, we have shown how to include finite precision
into the reasoning about non-contextual hidden variable
theories. Our analysis revolves around the idea that both
in quantum, as well as in possible classical models of any
given structure of contexts on an abstract set of out-
comes, this requires introducing a metric on the entities
of the model reflecting the degree of approximation. The
definition of ontological faithfulness is one, presumably
however not the only, way to formalize such a notion.
Since the MKC argument has been put forward, and
following the subsequent debate, other attempts to ad-
dress the finite precision objection have appeared. Ignor-
ing the ones that aimed at finding a flaw of some kind
in MKC (see [49] for an extensive review), we find rather
more interesting those introducing some other additional
property of the hidden variables that should guarantee
experimental testability. The most developed of these is
in the papers of Cabello et al. [54], Kirchmair et al. [23]
and Gu¨hne et al. [55] (cf. also [56]); there, the new el-
ement of sequential measurements was introduced and
the assumption concerns the behaviour of the hidden pa-
rameter, and the observable consequences thereof, under
sequences of (almost) compatible measurements. Some
such assumption is necessary as one can see from a suit-
able extension of the MKC models to include a simulation
of the state change due to measurement, which then is
able to reproduce to arbitrary precision the statistics of
sequences of measurements and the effects of the projec-
tion postulate.
It may not be possible to make a full comparison be-
tween this proposal and the one presented here, as on-
tological faithfulness is a minimally invasive change of
the BKS approach in which any experiment is an indi-
visible whole. In particular, it does not imply anything
about the history or dynamics of the hidden parame-
ter, as [23, 54–56] and related approaches necessarily
do. However, it is worth noting that simply assuming
no back-action on the hidden parameter, in an -ONC,
we have for i ∈ C ∩ C ′,
Pr{XC′i 6= ξ|XCi = ξ} ≤

Pr{XCi = ξ}
. (9)
I.e., unless the probability of observing an outcome i in
a context C is very small, the subsequent consultation
of the “same” outcome in a different context C ′ yields
the same value, with high probability. Thus, ontological
faithfulness of the hidden variable theory implies an ap-
proximate version of repeatability of measurements, even
on the level of the same outcome in different contexts.
Conversely, it seems likely that the approach of [55, 56]
always implies an -ONC hidden variable model, because
the assumptions in those papers imply that one can define
hidden variables corresponding to measuring some ob-
servable jointly with other, commuting, ones, and these
different variables turn out to be -close in the sense of
Definition 3. For this purpose, we stress that sequential
application of several measurement devices yields just
— another measurement, as does another ordering of
the same devices, or the unitary transfer of the state
into multiple qubits which are subsequently measured
in space-like separation, or for that matter any magical
mystery machine as long as it is governed by the rules of
quantum mechanics. What counts are the observations
that are actually going to be made, and once that is de-
cided, these observations can be reflected in a suitable
compatibility structure of outcomes and contexts. The
quantum mechanics of these devices and their sequential
application is taken care of by quantum theory itself; not
so for the hypothetical hidden variable theory, which has
to be augmented by additional assumptions to allow for
any meaningful comparison with quantum mechanics.
We shall refrain from arguing the plausibility of onto-
logical faithfulness; that does not seem to make a lot of
sense to the present author, unless one actually believes
in hidden variables (contextual or non-contextual) as a
viable description of quantum reality. What after all is
the point of no-go theorems? In the best case they reveal
the incompatibility between a set of preconceptions on
the one hand and a certain description of nature on the
other. This surely is a worthy enterprise, especially since
we keep struggling with that description in the case of
quantum mechanics. In this vein, no-go theorems, rather
than demonstrating a lack of imagination, really are in-
dispensable tools for a fruitful use of it [57].
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